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ntroduction and Short 
Rebuttal 
 
I deliberated whether it was worth 
addressing the response to my article 
from Juha Uitto, the Deputy Director of 
UNDP “Evaluations Office.” What made 
responding worthwhile was that Uitto 
offered to participate in a test of his 
commitment to reform and this journal 
agreed to print the results (below).  
In this section, I summarize Uitto’s 
response in a rebuttal. I highlight why 
UNDP and other donor evaluation 
systems are corrupted using Uitto’s very 
words as well as those of another 
evaluation professional who also seems to 
demonstrate a lack of understanding of 
the role of evaluations. 
Uitto notes that his office is a unit in 
UNDP which in fact has no real power 
over roughly 90 to 99% of the evaluations 
in UNDP. He refers to that “99%” or so as 
the “decentralized” evaluations 
undertaken by the country offices and 
over which Uitto’s unit in UNDP 
headquarters in New York admits it has 
“no line authority.” It was this “99%” and 
the lack of any oversight that I was 
critiquing in my piece. Uitto’s article is 
entitled, “Credibility and Independence of 
Evaluation in UNDP” but in fact he is only 
defending the “1%” of the evaluations that 
are done by or of his office, so there is 
already a bit of credibility problem just in 
his title and a question of what he means 
by “independence.” 
Readers of my piece and those who 
have used my evaluation rating system, 
will quickly note that Uitto had no 
scientific response to my evaluation rating 
system or the scoring of UNDP. My 
critique was that the UNDP country 
offices, like many other international 
organizations that work in an 
international “group think” have 
corrupted the UNDP evaluations system 
in violation of good governance. They 
have rigged the system to serve as a 
fundraising tool and to prevent any public 
oversight or accountability of funds. Uitto 
essentially has no disagreement with this. 
He says that UNDP offices simply look at 
“compliance not quality” and that his 
office finds a lack of any kind of quality in 
the evaluations if they are done at all. 
Helmut Eggers, the “former head of 
the Evaluation Division for DGs 
Development and External Relations, 
European Commission,” whom I have also 
never met, similarly offered an earlier 
response to my piece that does not note 
fault with any of the content but called on 
me to offer “an apology.” He challenges 
my use of the word “corrupt” to refer to a 
I
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system that I showed by analysis to be 
rigged to serve as a fundraising tool in 
ways that protect the continued 
employment of public officials, including 
evaluation officials, who derive personal 
benefit from evading use of established 
professional standards. I do apologize for 
not clarifying this specific form of 
corruption that I have alleged and that is 
too often ignored. I also use this 
opportunity to offer a concrete example so 
that there are no misunderstandings. 
Uitto, in fact, already partly makes my 
point in a way that responds to Eggers. He 
admits not only that his office has no 
power over most UNDP evaluations, but 
that anyone who looks at the overall 
system also finds it ineffective in 
protecting international laws and public 
purpose. He recognizes that it is unable to 
even to promote the sustainable human 
development mission that is supposed to 
be the goal of UNDP but is now only 
symbolic. In my view, UNDP’s sole 
mission is now its own “sales” to donors. 
It appears to exist only as a business to 
sell itself off to donor countries to lobby 
weaker governments for any law breaking 
purpose they please. (Generally, that 
purpose appears to be exploitation of 
country resources and destruction of 
minority cultures for the benefit of local 
ruling elites in concert with donor 
economic trade interests, or simply 
transfer of funds to bureaucrats to 
supplement their salaries.) Uitto would be 
hard pressed to find any actual standards 
for goals other than this that the United 
Nations (U.N.) actually fills. He would 
also be hard pressed to prove that the 
U.N.’s “Millennium Development Goals” 
are anything more than a fundraising 
slogan and tool to support whatever a 
donor wants to buy, no matter what it 
does. He seems genuinely baffled as to 
what UNDP’s organizational mission is or 
why it should even be held to the 
international laws that it exists to 
implement. As he wrote me, “the 
Executive Board and senior management 
in UNDP are very much aware of these 
problems, but it's not fully clear how to 
improve the situation.” 
My article referenced a series of 
indicators that I have been developing to 
hold the U.N. system directly to its own 
legal mission and that I have used in 
UNDP evaluations to test them. I also 
pointed to the specific problems in the 
U.N. system that lead to the rigging of 
evaluations and the undermining of 
development professionals and evaluators 
in ways that prevent them from doing 
their jobs within the U.N. system or even 
from following the law. I note exactly what 
can be changed. I have designed 
professional ethics codes and note the 
professional measurements and best 
practices that the U.N. system has, but has 
directly worked to undermine in order to 
make itself unaccountable. These 
solutions are now being vetted by the 
profession. Uitto did not endorse a single 
one of them in his article nor did he offer 
any alternatives. 
Uitto largely argues that the criticisms 
of UNDP don’t apply to his office that 
runs transparent evaluations (though the 
rest of the system doesn’t) and follows 
professionalism (though the rest of the 
system doesn’t). In other words, the one 
office that serves no real program function 
may follow some standards, but the 
offices that spend the funds do not. Uitto’s 
office gives the illusion of one that sets 
and holds the U.N. system to real 
standards and protects the evaluation 
profession, but it appears that it is really 
just another academic office behind a 
label, that mostly justifies itself writing 
articles and reports at public expense. 
Other organizations have similar offices, 
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working to write “standards” that offer no 
professional or ethics code or contract 
protection at all to outside evaluators and 
holding no one in their organizations 
accountable to any laws. Uitto’s office has 
no enforcement power or authority in the 
U.N. system because it has no direct 
control over funds and no direct contact 
with the public. Apparently, it cannot even 
write or change the evaluation contracts 
issued by the U.N. legal office. 
In fact, any professional standards that 
Uitto’s office writes are immediately 
erased by the standard contract issued by 
the UN’s legal office that gives U.N. 
bureaucrats the authority to withhold 
payment to evaluators for any reason at 
all. One wonders why his office even exists 
other than perhaps for window dressing. 
Uitto doesn’t really disagree. 
The thrust of Uitto article, where he 
does not directly agree, essentially 
demonstrates the validity of my criticisms 
of the U.N. evaluations system where he 
seems to disagree. Uitto argues that 
consultants should not be “independent” 
of the very bureaucrats who have conflict 
of interest and should not be able to hold 
them accountable for wasteful spending or 
legal violations or to have the ability to 
alert the public and to call for stopping 
illegal, failing or non-producing projects! 
He sees consultants who protect the 
public, who can be held to public 
standards, who can take issues to public 
courts, and who are licensed by public 
bodies rather than beholden to his self-
interested colleagues at UNDP, as 
something dangerous! Indeed, 
bureaucrats, including Uitto, simply do 
not seem to understand, do not seem to 
want, and appear to use public funds to 
make every effort to undermine real 
public control and to try to replace it with 
bureaucratic discretion. This is a callous 
disregard for public accountability and 
democracy in the belief that bureaucrats 
are the self-appointed authorities in place 
of the public.  
Hopefully, most readers of Uitto’s 
piece would have seen through this 
argument quickly. They would agree that 
it is the professional role of evaluators to 
protect the public interest and to act. They 
would agree that it is a professional duty 
to turn information over to accountable 
public bodies who will act to protect the 
public. Through their professional 
obligations and codes, independent 
evaluators are designated to represent the 
public. If they can bring material to the 
press and to courts without facing 
retaliation from U.N. bureaucrats, they 
would be working on the side of the public 
and enforcing public standards. Uitto 
avoids any mention of courts or the press 
in his article or in our correspondence and 
sees only other public enriched 
bureaucrats as “the public.” 
Still, Uitto claims that UNDP is 
working on reform. In my view, the UNDP 
has little track record to earn anyone’s 
trust other than the trust of a few high 
paid professionals who are paid 
specifically to protect their fellow 
bureaucrats. My cynicism after having 
worked for the U.N. system in nine 
countries and having been invited to 
participate in activities I viewed as illegal 
in a number several times that, is the basis 
for that belief. My article described the 
legal and political failures that were at 
fault. Indeed, I have the same experience 
and identical criticisms of the European 
Commission (E.C.) and a number of other 
international agencies that essentially 
coordinate their activities with each other 
(with the E.C. and its agencies as one of 
the donors purchasing projects in the U.N. 
to use the U.N. as an intermediary to 
lobby governments in Europe’s sphere of 
influence). Neither the U.N. nor my 
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government’s supposed oversight, nor the 
U.N. Executive Board acknowledge, let 
alone investigate, the kind of corruption 
(as defined above) that I have brought to 
their attention. I, myself, have been the 
victim of U.N. system practices that I 
believe, as a lawyer, to be illegal but that 
may be almost impossible to stop given 
that there are no directly accessible public 
mechanisms, like country courts, that 
appear to have the incentive or power to 
act against U.N. bureaucrats at the direct 
request of citizens (though that also can 
be tested). 
As a scholar, I have the obligation to 
put beliefs to the test and to offer proof. 
Why not put Juha Uitto to the test and 
invite him to work together as two 
professionals working on reforms to test 
the credibility of his arguments in a 
constructive and positive way? 
This is a scientific journal. Why not 
run a social experiment? Why not give 
Uitto and the UNDP Evaluations Office a 
chance to support a solution, offering the 
good publicity and goodwill of the journal, 
in an area where Uitto does have the 
power to act? 
The perfect case to test, to see if Uitto’s 
office really believes in reform, is to see if 
he will help change a situation that is 
commonly faced by and is odious to 
evaluation professionals. Unilateral 
evaluation contracts, like those that the 
U.N. legal office itself uses, eviscerate the 
very standards that Uitto’s office writes 
and make those standards unenforceable 
for every outside consultant who is hired 
at UNDP. Such contracts are the norm at 
all the major donor agencies. These 
contracts strip away professional licensing 
and whistleblower protections, thus 
turning evaluators into puppets or ghost 
writers, directly under the thumb of 
bureaucrats as a condition of payment. (In 
the case of the E.C., private companies 
who hire consultants are paid the same 
price as consultants but since they are not 
subject to the same professional licenses 
and standards as consultants, they are 
directly under the pressure of E.C. 
bureaucrats to hire (unscrupulous) and 
fire (honest) individual consultants as a 
“business decision”.) It is these contracts 
that put evaluation professionals in the 
position of being pressured to break the 
laws, cover up public information (the 
U.N. and E.C. now both have secrecy 
clauses that act to protect bureaucrats and 
to hide information, including corruption, 
from the public), and even to falsify 
documents. This test offers one of the 
clearest situations where no one calling 
himself a member of our profession and 
who knows the reality of pressured 
evaluations could refuse to agree to 
reform. 
Remarkably, such an empirical test 
appeared and Uitto agreed to participate. 
The editor of this journal agreed to 
publish the test. 
Here I report the results. 
 
The Test Case, Described 
 
A perfect test case of the UNDP 
Evaluation system’s commitment to 
“reform” fell into my lap just when Uitto’s 
piece appeared. The Millennium 
Development Goal-Fund (MDG-F), a 530 
Million Euro Spanish fund to UNDP, 
chose me as an evaluator of a project of 
UNDP Namibia. It represented about 1% 
of the fund and offered a good litmus test 
of the system. What makes the $6 million 
project in Namibia a good test case is that 
even without my analysis, the existing 
documents already revealed the project as 
a failure that had escaped proper scrutiny. 
The question here, as elsewhere, was 
whether the evaluation would be a U.N. 
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system rubber stamp designed to keep the 
money flowing, or whether the recipients 
and the taxpayers in the donor country 
would have their rights fully protected by 
an independent evaluator free to expose 
failures to the public and to act 
“independently” of the very bureaucrats 
who had (possibly) corrupted the project. 
This is a case where it would be easy for 
Uitto to step in if he chose and where the 
harms appear so egregious that the 
professional responsibility to act is also 
clear. 
The project I was asked to evaluate in 
Namibia showed several signs of being a 
“human zoo” project, exploiting Namibia’s 
local cultures in violation of the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and the U.N. Convention on 
Genocide. Like several other projects, it is 
being promoted as fitting the “Millennium 
Development Goals” (MDG’s) for 
sustainable development on the basis of 
its creating “income” for the natives while 
actually doing nothing to promote 
sustainability of their cultures in their 
environments. Its goal is now to turn 
threatened native peoples into performers 
and exhibits for foreign tourists as a 
means of generating “income” for the 
amusement of foreigners in the global 
economy. With all the other resources 
taken by earlier colonialism, this 
“sustainable tourism” and “income 
generation” includes new treasure hunts 
(this time it is “heritage hunts”) to find the 
remaining exploitable assets (now it is 
“cultural assets” – the people themselves) 
for the latest kind of mining and low wage 
employment (performances and 
production of “sweat-shop” handicrafts 
following foreign designs). Like earlier 
colonialism that was described as a 
“civilizing mission,” this project is also 
described as saving the peoples; training 
them to be servants and to accept that this 
in their only choice. Part of this work they 
call “creative industries.” 
The MDG-F Secretariat had already 
made some of these criticisms in the 
project documents, though in much softer 
euphemisms and with no attempt to stop 
the project (in fact, just the opposite). 
Though the stated goal of the funding was 
to promote the MDGs, neither the 
Concept Note nor any other project 
documents for the Namibia project 
contain a simple statement of a 
sustainable development problem for 
identifiable, named cultural groups or the 
specific relation of the MDGs to the 
problems of those groups. 
The project documents are silent on 
the most basic requirements of a 
development intervention that offers the 
standard for evaluation: whose behaviors 
(which target actors) need to be changed 
for what specific results with what 
measurable indicators of such change to 
address what root causes with specific 
interventions. The entire Joint 
Programme document’s “Results 
Framework” of some 20 pages and 13 
“outputs” lacks a single quantitative 
baseline measure that can be used to 
calculate success of any outputs related to 
changed behaviors or that can be directly 
linked to measurable sustainable 
development outcomes. This is a project 
that fails at every level and that never 
should have even started if an appropriate 
monitoring and evaluation system with 
independent powers were in place. 
The Director of the MDG-Fund, 
Sophie de Caen, is on record opposing 
funding of the project before it began 
(with full documentation not referenced 
in this short article, but available in a 
longer version from the author). Despite 
her earlier recorded objections (not made 
public), not only did she later agree to 
support the funding without any apparent 
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changes in the project. She agreed to 
support the project under a set of 
definitions that now reverse the Fund’s 
own goals for “culture and development” 
and for international treaty obligations for 
protecting the cultures of indigenous 
peoples and their sustainable 
development. There is more than a hint 
that the original definition of “cultural 
heritage” in the project’s Concept Note (of 
“cultural life and identity” including 
economic, political, legal and social 
practices”) met treaty standards but was 
transformed and narrowed in ways that 
turned a potentially appropriate project 
into one that seems to violate major 
treaties. “Sustainability” was redefined 
not in terms of people but of products; 
what can be displayed and marketed to 
foreigners in ways that probably 
undermine the very cultures that such 
project should be designed to protect. 
What an evaluator would need here to 
assure compliance and to protect 
spending is the independence to expose 
the wrongdoing to the correct levels, to 
assure public accountability, and to assure 
that the misconduct would be stopped. To 
do that, an evaluator would require the 
very contract protections that my previous 
article enumerated and on which I found 
the U.N. system at fault. Unless Uitto’s 
office would step in to argue for these 
protections, any talk of “reforms” and 
“independence” from his office is simply 
meaningless. Here’s why. 
Without such protections, to put it 
bluntly, an evaluator could easily be 
forced to limit the evaluation to only a 
determination of whether the “zoos” were 
being built on schedule and whether the 
correct number of natives was being 
exploited in keeping with the “targets.” 
Indeed, the project’s Program Advisor 
(whose name the journal wishes to 
protect) began to hint this was her role. 
Only with independence would an 
evaluator be free to investigate the 
apparent distortion of U.N.’s mission, its 
apparent violation of international 
treaties and laws, and its apparent 
overriding of all development principles 
and procedures. Only with protection 
would an evaluator have the 
independence to try to stop the funding if 
he/she found legal violations. Only with 
protections would an evaluator be free 
from pressure to support any illegality 
and immorality that was discovered. Only 
with protections would an evaluator be 
able to assure that he/she would receive 
his/her entire payment and that his/her 
future career prospects in evaluations 
would not be in jeopardy. 
The contract that MDG-F told me to 
sign was the standard UNDP evaluation 
contract that could be used to ensure a 
rubber stamp evaluation to keep the funds 
flowing, hide the wrongdoing, stop all 
questions about oversight failures and 
legality, eliminate public transparency 
and accountability, and protect all U.N. 
system individuals from any outside 
investigations or publicity. 
In what is also not uncommon, the 
process of the evaluation as presented to 
me already appeared to have been rigged. 
Even before receiving an inception report, 
UNDP in Namibia had already planned 
my meetings and visit. They wanted to 
assure a quick evaluation so that the next 
segment of funds would continue to flow 
without interruption. This had all the 
hallmarks of a rubber stamp evaluation 
that would be too short, too controlled 
and two politicized for the asking of real 
questions about what had really happened 
and how it could be fixed.  
The MDG-F Secretariat has two 
evaluation officials (whose names the 
journal also wishes to protect, though they 
are public officials), who both claimed 
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that they had no power at all to protect 
Spanish funds from rigging by the U.N. 
system. They gave me an ultimatum. Sign 
the form contract or else. 
The test of Uitto’s commitment was to 
ask Uitto for help. I wanted to test 
whether Uitto would agree to act in the 
very area where his office does have 
power. The MDG-F’s Secretariat told me 
that they relied on the UNDP Evaluations 
office standards (those of Uitto’s office) 
even though the contract they gave me 
substituted “UNDP satisfaction” (i.e., 
bureaucratic discretion and authority) in 
place of those standards and also made 
sure that there would be no courts to 
enforce standards. If they were relying on 
Uitto’s office and if they represented the 
Spanish government, it would be very 
easy for the Spanish government, with 
Uitto’s endorsement, to offer me the 
contract protections of professional 
standards that I required and to improve 
the contract for all other evaluators.  
Uitto doesn’t control the money for 
UNDP evaluations and that is why his 
office has no power. His office is too weak 
to convince the U.N. system’s own lawyers 
to establish professional standards as the 
standard of review in evaluator contracts. 
It is also too weak to let the public hear 
from professionals in a court of law if 
there is a dispute, in ways that would 
follow democratic governance procedures. 
But, Spain would very likely listen to 
Uitto’s professional advice if he gave it. 
Spain is a democracy. Its funds set up the 
MDG-F. Spain could hire evaluators 
under its own contract, protecting its own 
funds, protecting evaluators, freeing itself 
from the conflicts of interest of UNDP 
bureaucrats who received Spanish funds 
and who have the power to manipulate 
the evaluation of how those funds are 
spent. 
That is exactly what I asked Uitto to 
do. For reasons of length, my full letter to 
Uitto is not presented here (it is available 
from the author along with Uitto’s 
responses), but it essentially reiterates 
points from my previous article and 
outlines concrete steps that Uitto could 
take. 
 
The UNDP Response 
 
Uitto could have worked with me to 
establish a precedent on UNDP contracts 
that would have solved the rigging and 
pressuring of evaluators and that would 
have made a major inroad in improving 
U.N. evaluations in one easy step. He 
admitted as much. But he refused to do 
so. 
Could we have worked together on a 
model contract and convinced the MDG-F 
to use it? Certainly. Here are Uitto’s own 
words. “[S]ome of our larger donors 
[already] do institute their own 
evaluations” and could easily demand 
professional protections of evaluators and 
an end to bureaucratic conflicts of 
interest. 
So why wouldn’t Uitto agree? 
Evaluators hired by businesses negotiate 
contract terms and these contracts are 
enforceable by courts throughout the 
world. Uitto writes, “It is actually UNDP 
policy and in line with the Paris 
Declaration that when donors give funds 
to UNDP (and other agencies) they will 
abide by the agency’s own evaluation 
function.” But agencies have also signed 
treaties on anti-corruption, on rights 
enforcement and on good governance. 
The Paris Declaration doesn’t give 
bureaucrats the license to violate 
international laws at whim. 
Uitto’s response was bureaucratic 
avoidance of something he could easily 
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have done. At the same time, it was to 
characterize professional standards, law 
and democracy as a “nightmare” (for 
bureaucrats). “You can imagine what kind 
of nightmare it would be if every donor 
imposed their own evaluations on UNDP.” 
That was hardly what my test was 
suggesting. I was ready to work within 
UNDP’s evaluation framework. All that I 
was asking from Uitto and the U.N. 
system for was professional protection of 
evaluator independence from political 
pressures on payment so that evaluators 
are able to professionally do their work, 
uphold UNDP and international laws and 
do their job as they are licensed. Uitto 
refused to support this. 
Rather than answer me, Uitto went on 
to simply give a defense of the status quo. 
I’ll present it here. 
“For better or for worse, the Executive 
Board consisting of government 
representatives is the ultimate oversight 
body for UNDP … UNEG has been 
conducting peer reviews of the 
multilateral organizations' evaluation 
systems to strengthen them and to 
enhance their reliability (UNDP's 
evaluation function was peer reviewed in 
2005, which led to the new evaluation 
policy in 2006). This is not a bureaucratic 
or disrespectful response. On the 
contrary, I am taking the time to clarify 
some aspects of UN governance. I can't 
quite imagine how and what kind of other 
public body could be established. UNDP is 
accountable to the tax payers in donor and 
partner countries through the Executive 
Board.” 
Uitto does not appear to have any 
interest at all in the problems evaluators 
face in the real world and protections they 
need to do their work and protect the 
public. That may be because he works as a 
public bureaucrat without facing any of 
those pressures and without any real 
incentives to act to protect those 
standards. 
If I had signed the UNDP contract, 
gone to work in Namibia and tried to do 
my job, I almost certainly would have 
been pressured to break the law and 
falsify my report under condition of 
payment. My contract would not have 
protected me any protection. Uitto’s office 
also would not have protected me because 
it has no power and would not exercise 
the little power it had. If I were to follow 
Uitto’s advice and go to the U.N. 
Executive Board, they would almost 
certainly have laughed in my face. They 
would claim that they do not deal with 
individual cases and lack the staff. The 
U.S. State Department and U.S. Congress 
(I have worked for both) would respond 
the same way. The way things work in the 
real world, only an appropriate contract 
and an ability to go to the courts would 
offer protection. Uitto’s response shows 
his desire to eviscerate both. 
To Uitto, democracy and protection of 
evaluators is a “nightmare.” Apparently, it 
is more of a nightmare than the nightmare 
of cultural destruction for indigenous 
peoples, of environmental destruction, or 
of the unlivability of the planet. 
Apparently, it is more of a nightmare than 
the pressures and blacklisting and harms 
to careers suffered by evaluators who 
work for systems like the UNDP with no 
independence and no protection of 
professional standards. 
This is why, in my view, the UNDP 
evaluation system is in trouble and UNDP 
itself is in a downward spiral of increasing 
malfeasance, illegality and corruption. 
This is why we need strong indicators and 
independent journals to offer the reality 
check that these organizations cannot and 
will not do themselves. 
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The Double Test this Case 
Offers 
 
The reason I offered the description of the 
UNDP’s Namibia project, above, is 
because this case offers a second empirical 
test for the reader. Now that Uitto and the 
UNDP have refused to change their form 
contract for this MDG-F evaluation in 
Namibia, the evaluation and project have 
gone ahead. 
The evaluation is likely already 
completed with a consultant who agreed 
to a pressured contract. If the actual 
evaluation appears publicly at all, it will 
almost certainly whitewash the project 
and serve as an advertisement for 
continued U.N. system funding of the 





Talk is cheap. Results speak for 
themselves. I invented an evaluation 
rating system as an easy way to hold 
evaluation systems accountable. UNDP 
dodged discussion of the indicator and 
claimed to be committed to reforms. But, 
behind the rhetoric is an ideology of 
bureaucratic authoritarianism with no 
apparent commitment to change. 
Taking this principled stand cost me a 
contract and any follow up work. The time 
that I put into preparation, waiting and 
trying to change the contract probably 
equals the work of the contract for most 
consultants. I have not had an E.C. or 
U.N. contract since JMDE’s publication of 
this article. Uitto continues in his position 
as far as I know. 
I believe in our public systems like the 
U.N. and the E.C. (and Europe at its best). 
I believe in law. I believe in 
professionalism. This is one of those times 
when we need to be aggressive, clear and 
committed if we are going to protect 
civilization and the systems we need to 
promote it from unraveling. That 
demands some sacrifices from all of us, 
particularly those of us in the positions to 
make a difference. 
